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_*SIX MONTHS COOLING-OFF PERIOD UNDER SECTION 13B(2) OF HINDU MARRIAGE ACT NOT MANDATORY: SC*_

_The Supreme Court today held that minimum period of six months stipulated under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act) for a motion for passing decree of divorce on the basis of mutual consent is not mandatory and can be waived by courts depending on the facts and circumstances of the case._

_The judgment was delivered by a Bench of *Justices AK Goel and UU Lalit* in an appeal against a judgment of the Delhi High Court._

The question which arose for consideration before the Court was whether the minimum period of six months stipulated under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for passing decree of divorce on the basis of mutual consent is mandatory or can be relaxed in exceptional situations.

In the instant case, the parties had sought waiver of the period of six months for the second motion on the ground that they were living separately for more than eight years and there is no possibility of their re-union. The parties moved the Supreme Court on the ground that only the Supreme Court can relax the six months period as per its earlier decisions.

The Court considered the submissions of the parties and the Amicus Curiae brief background of the relevant provision – Section 13B(2).

“Under the traditional Hindu Law, as it stood prior to the statutory law on the point, marriage is a sacrament and cannot be dissolved by consent. The Act enabled the court to dissolve marriage on statutory grounds. By way of amendment in the year 1976, the concept of divorce by mutual consent was introduced. However, Section 13B(2) contains a bar to divorce being granted before six months of time elapsing after filing of the divorce petition by mutual consent. The said period was laid down to enable the parties to have a rethink so that the court grants divorce by mutual consent only if there is no chance for reconciliation.”

It said that the object of the provision is to enable the parties to dissolve a marriage by consent if the marriage has irretrievably broken down and to enable them to rehabilitate them as per the available options.

It held that the cooling-off period prescribed by the provision was to safeguard against a hurried decision and was not to perpetuate a purposeless marriage.

“The amendment was inspired by the thought that forcible perpetuation of status of matrimony between unwilling partners did not serve any purpose. The object of the cooling off the period was to safeguard against a hurried decision if there was otherwise possibility of differences being reconciled. The object was not to perpetuate a purposeless marriage or to prolong the agony of the parties when there was no chance of reconciliation. Though every effort has to be made to save a marriage, if there are no chances of reunion and there are chances of fresh rehabilitation, the Court should not be powerless in enabling the parties to have a better option.”

The Court then proceeded to consider whether the cooling-off period is mandatory or directory. It opined that in deciding the same, the language alone is not always decisive and that the Court should have the regard to the context, the subject matter and the object of the provision.

It, therefore, proceeded to hold that the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory and held the following:

“we are of the view that where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following :

i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself;

ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of Order # # Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further efforts;

iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties;

iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony.

The Court concluded that since the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be open to the Court to exercise its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation.

Citation:
*[Amardeep Singh Vs. Harveen Kaur]*
_Civil Appeal No. 11158 of 2017_
_{arising out of SPL (Civil) No. 20184 of 2017}_
*Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel*

सुप्रीम कोर्ट का बड़ा फैसला: कहा- शादी से बाहर यौन संबंध बनाना अपराध नहीं लेकिन तलाक के लिए हो सकता है आधार

स्त्री-पुरुष के विवाहेतर संबंधों से जुड़ी भारतीय दंड संहिता (आईपीसी) की धारा-497 को सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने असंवैधानिक करार दिया है। पांच जजों की बेंच में शामिल चीफ जस्टिस दीपक मिश्रा, जस्टिस एएम खानविलकर और जस्टिस आरएफ नरीमन ने आईपीसी के सेक्शन 497 को अपराध के दायरे से बाहर करने का आदेश दिया। CJI और जस्टिस खानविलकर ने अपने फैसले में कहा कि अडल्टरी तलाक का आधार हो सकता है लेकिन यह अपराध नहीं होगा। पीठ में जस्टिस डीवाई चंद्रचूड़ और इंदु मल्होत्रा भी शामिल हैं।
.. खुदकुशी पर चलेगा केस

सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने अपने फैसले में कहा कि अडल्टरी अपराध तो नहीं होगा लेकिन अगर पत्नी अपने लाइफ पार्टनर के व्यभिचार के कारण खुदकुशी करती है तो सबूत पेश करने के बाद इसमें खुदकुशी के लिए उकसाने का मामला चल सकता है।

केंद्र की दलील

इससे पहले 8 अगस्त को हुई सुनवाई के बाद सुप्रीम कोर्ट की संवैधानिक बेंच ने फैसला सुरक्षित रख लिया था। सुप्रीम कोर्ट में केंद्र सरकार ने कहा था कि अडल्टरी अपराध है और इससे परिवार और विवाह तबाह होता है। सुप्रीम कोर्ट के चीफ जस्टिस दीपक मिश्रा की अगुआई वाली संवैधानिक बेंच ने सुनवाई के बाद कहा था कि मामले में फैसला बाद में सुनाया जाएगा।

आईपीसी की धारा-497 के तहत पुरुषों को माना जाता है अपराधी

गौरतलब है कि आईपीसी की धारा-497 के प्रावधान के तहत पुरुषों को अपराधी माना जाता है जबकि महिला विक्टिम मानी गई है। सुप्रीम कोर्ट में याचिकाकर्ता का कहना था कि महिलाओं को अलग तरीके से नहीं देखा जा सकता क्योंकि आईपीसी की किसी भी धारा में जेंडर विषमताएं नहीं हैं।याचिका में कहा गया था कि आईपीसी की धारा-497 के तहत जो कानूनी प्रावधान हैं वह पुरुषों के साथ भेदभाव वाला है। आपको बता दें कि अडल्टरी के मामले में पुरुषों को दोषी पाए जाने पर सजा दिए जाने का प्रावधान है जबकि महिलाओं को नहीं।

सहमति से संबंध पर यह थी मांग

याचिका में कहा गया है कि अगर कोई शादीशुदा पुरुष किसी और शादीशुदा महिला के साथ उसकी सहमति से संबंध बनाता है तो ऐसे संबंध बनाने वाले पुरुष के खिलाफ उक्त महिला का पति अडल्टरी का केस दर्ज करा सकता है लेकिन संबंध बनाने वाली महिला के खिलाफ मामला दर्ज करने का प्रावधान नहीं है जो भेदभाव वाला है और इस प्रावधान को गैर-संवैधानिक घोषित किया जाए।

Whether decree will be deemed to be exparte decree if defendant has filed his written statement?
Looking to the law as laid down by the Supreme Court and thereafter followed by our Court, what becomes clear is that where the Defendant has filed his Written Statement but remains absent on the date when the suit is called out for hearing and where the Defendant has not led any evidence, the suit can be disposed of (as per Order XVII Rule 2) only in any of the modes as prescribed under Order IX. Once the suit is disposed of under Order IX and the Defendant had not appeared at the hearing of the suit and a decree is passed in his absence, then, an application to set aside that decree is certainly maintainable under Order IX Rule 13. This being the clear enunciation of the law, I find that the Courts below were totally in error in coming to the conclusion that merely because the Defendant was served with the writ of summons and filed his Written Statement and thereafter did not appear, the decree passed could not be said to be one as being ex-parte.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition (L) No. 17138 of 2017

Decided On: 28.06.2017

R.P. Bros Vs. Fakhruddin Siraj Topiwala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B.P. Colabawalla, J.

*Citation: 2017(6) MHLJ 845*

Whether court can condone delay in case of dishonour of cheque without hearing accused?

The other plea relating to delay of 62 days and taking of cognizance without issuing notice to dispense with such delay is however found to have substance. The relevant provision Under Section 142 of the Act requires making of the complaint within one month of cause of action arising on account of non-compliance with the demand in the notice to make payment within 15 days. According to Appellant the notice was dated 03.02.2006 alleging non-payment of two cheques each for Rs. 1,80,000/-. Allegedly the Appellant had sent a reply denying his liability through a reply dated 20.02.2006. The complaint was filed on 24.05.2006. Prima facie, in view of aforesaid dates the complaint was beyond the permissible period. No doubt the court has been empowered to take cognizance even after the prescribed period but only if the complainant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making complaint within the prescribed period.
Learned senior Counsel for the Appellant has relied upon judgment of this Court in the case of P.K. Choudhury v. Commander, 48 BRTF (GREF) MANU/SC/7321/2008 : (2008) 13 SCC 229 to support his submission that for condoning delay in filing complaint beyond the period of limitation, natural justice warrants notice to the accused so as to grant him an opportunity to show that the delay should not be condoned.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 247 of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 8058 of 2012) and Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 8092 of 2012)
Decided On: 11.04.2016

K.S. Joseph Vs. Philips Carbon Black Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Dipak Misra and Shiva Kirti Singh, JJ.
*Citation:AIR 2016 SC 2149*